We theoretically and experimentally examine a situation in which the principal has better information about the agent's ability than the agent himself. The principal can inform the agent about his ability by giving him performance feedback but there might be incentives for her to lie about it. Analyzing a simple signaling model yields the following results. (1) The principal only tells the truth if there are sufficiently high costs of lying. (2) When the principal's marginal return on the agent's effort increases, deception is more likely to occur. We observed ambiguity, however, when testing these theoretical results in a lab experiment. On one hand, the data provide evidence indicating that subjects indeed suffer from costs of lying in this context. On the other hand, we do not find more deception with higher marginal return on the agents' effort for the principal. Instead we observe exactly the opposite pattern: higher marginal returns on the agents' effort lead to more honest principals.
Introduction
Giving feedback is a well-established practice in human resource management. Thus, annual or quarterly appraisals are often set-up in companies. But can an employee trust the information he is given in feedback interviews? As the employer knows that his staff will react to the information, he might have an incentive to give strategic rather than truthful feedback.
Often the employer has a better perception of how capable his employees are to fulfill their jobs than they themselves know. Especially, when someone enters a new job, he only has an expectation about how well he will perform. For many tasks and due to more experience an employer who has observed the output of an employee gets a good impression about the employee's talent for a certain task. Then the question arises, if it makes sense for the employer to inform his staff members honestly about their actual ability. This would or should be the typical content of an appraisal but two questions arise:
• Should the employer be honest to everybody and tell them their actual ability? To answer this question he should take into account the next question.
• How will the employees react, if they know that their employer can decide to give them feedback or not and that he can tell them the truth or not? For an employee getting feedback is the only way to update his expectation about his own ability. However, previous results show that people adapt their effort if they learn that they are more or less talented because their marginal returns are lower or higher than expected. Having this reaction in mind, giving truthful feedback leads not in every case to a higher profit for the employer. Thus the employer might not be well advised to give every employee feedback on theirs ability honestly. 1 In light of various religious commandments and folk wisdom sayings from 1 In the literature we find a huge amount of psychological studies on feedback, for an overview see Latham and Locke (1990) , Latham and Locke (1991) or Kluger and DeNisi (1996) . Whereas in the economic literature, feedback in an employer-employee relationship is -to the best of our knowledge -so far not well analyzed. Mohnen and Pokorny (2007) provide a simple economic model on the agent's reaction to feedback and test their implications using an experimental data set.
around the world, most societies seem to adhere to ethical standards that proscribe lying. However, standard economists claim that the completely selfish homo economicus uses dishonesty whenever it serves to maximize his own utility. But losing trust in other peoples' statements due to negative experiences with deception might result in considerable costs for the respective organization. While the organization may bear the cost of individuals' lies, for the liar dishonesty seems to be particularly attractive in situations characterized by a conflict of interest. Evidence for this has been found in studies on cheap talk games (for theoretical models see Park (2005) and his literature overview; for experimental studies see e.g. Charness (2000) ; Crawford (1998) provides a survey of experiments with cheap talk). In a recent experimental study Gneezy (2005) examined deception in situations with a conflict of interest. He finds that the fraction of subjects utilizing lies strongly depends on the consequences that arise from lying. If it is more beneficial for them, subjects lie more often. Yet Gneezy (2005) found that subjects also care about the consequences the lies have on their counterpart. Thus, if deception strongly reduces their counterpart's payoff, they will refrain from lying more frequently than if there is little impact on their counterpart's payoff.
One possible information asymmetry might be the principal having information on the agent's productivity or ability to accomplish a certain task. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) develop a similar approach by assuming that the principal has better information on the agent's effort costs. In this context they examine the role of bonus payments as a signal of task attractiveness. Related to Bénabou and Tirole (2003) we make the assumption, that if an agent enters a new job his employer has a better perception of how capable the employee is to fulfill his job than the agent himself has. As he is new, he typically does not know how well-matched his abilities are with the tasks corresponding to the job. Many firms try to overcome the described asymmetry by conducting feedback talks so that the employee receives the information gathered through observation. However, we question whether an employee can always trust the information he is given in feedback discussions.
Suppose there is a set of heterogenous employees in which some demonstrate high and some demonstrate low ability for the work. Then the question arises: should the employer be honest with the full range of employees and truthfully reveal their individual abilities to them. To answer this question, it is important to consider the employee's reaction to this feedback, taking into account that his boss can decide whether to give feedback or not and whether to lie or not. Whenever employees are interested in their production output they produce, their own ability to do the task becomes an important piece of information for them. For example, a candid assessment of their ability might be important to an employee if he is paid an output contingent wage or if output influences his future career opportunities.
Obviously, in these cases, people will adapt their effort levels if they learn that they are more or less productive because their marginal returns are higher or lower than they expected a priori. Therefore giving truthful feedback does not lead to higher profits for the employer in every case. Since the employer's interest is to encourage her staff to work hard, she would have an incentive to tell each of them that they have high ability if they believed her feedback information naively. The rationale behind this is the following: Given an output contingent wage, an employee will work more if he believes that he has a high ability because high achievers have higher marginal returns than those with low ability. Thus, the employer might not be well advised to give every employee honest feedback on their ability, if in some cases, honest feedback would yield lower returns for her.
In this paper, we try to shed light on this conflict of interest in two steps. First, we analyze a two-period signaling game in which the principal knows her agent's ability perfectly after the first period while the agent does not. We assume that there are two types of agents, those with high ability and those with low ability, where the agent's ability is equivalent to his work productivity. In both periods the agent makes an effort decision and his wage is contingent on the output he produces. The agent's output is affected by his actual ability for the task and the effort he makes. After the first period, the principal can give positive (ability is high), negative (ability is low) or no feedback to the agent. If deception (i.e. giving positive feedback although the true ability is low and vice versa) does not generate any costs, no separating equilibria exist in the game. As merely pooling equilibria can be established, the ability information will never be revealed and consequently the agent will choose an optimal effort level according to his a priori expectation of his ability. Introducing positive costs of lying makes separating equilibria feasible provided that these (signaling) costs are sufficiently high. In these equilibria, the agent's actual ability is revealed directly or indirectly by the feedback information of the principal. Thus, our (1.) main result is: If the costs of lying are sufficiently high, separating equilibria are feasible and therefore the feedback information is informative. Additionally, we examine the impact of the height of the principal's marginal return on the agent's effort and obtain the (2.) main result: If the principal benefits less from the agent's effort, i.e. her marginal returns are lower for each effort unit exerted by the agent, she is less likely to lie. As the return from deception decreases with the marginal returns from the agent's effort, she has a lower incentive to lie for any given costs of lying.
In the second part of the paper we test these theoretical results in a laboratory experiment in which the principals might have incentives to give positive feedback to their agents' independent of the true ability. Similar to the theoretical model we matched one principal to one agent for two periods. In each of the periods the agent chose an effort level and had to bear the respective costs of effort. After the first period the principal was informed about both, the agent's actual ability and his output, and decided whether she wanted to give feedback to the agent or not. If she decided to give feedback she could choose between positive (ability is high) or negative (ability is low) feedback. We did not introduce monetary costs of lying, thus any deception did not directly affect the principal's monetary payoff in the experiment. Hence, the costs of lying are an individual's psychological costs.
According to our theoretical framework, we ran two main conditions: a baseline and a low return condition. In the latter, we decreased the principal's returns on the output produced by the agent compared to the baseline condition. This allowed us to examine whether the principals lie less often if lying becomes less attractive monetarily.
Our experimental data give evidence for the following conclusions: Principals give positive feedback less frequently if matched to a low ability agent than if matched to a high ability agent. This indicates that they do consider the true ability when giving feedback and therefore the existence of costs of lying. In contrast to our theoretical results and to Gneezy (2005) we do not find more deception with higher returns on the agents' efforts. Instead we observe exactly the opposite pattern with decreasing frequency of deception with higher returns on lying. So apparently lower returns do not enhance honesty but decrease the fraction of honest feedback.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we analyze the signaling model. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. We derive hypotheses in section 4 and present the experimental results in section 5. The last section concludes the paper.
Theory

Model Set-up
We analyze a two-period model with riskneutral parties. A principal employs an agent whose ability a is unknown to both of them ex ante. In each period, the agent produces an output y t which is linear in his chosen effort level e t with y t (a, e t ) = a · e t , t = 1, 2. Effort is assumed to be observable but not verifiable. The agent's ability a to produce the output y t can be either low or high, i.e. a ∈ {a L ; a H } with E [a] =ā and a L <ā < a H . The prior distribution is such that high ability a H occurs with probability τ and low ability a L with probability 1 − τ . Further, we assume quadratic effort costs of the form c(e t ) = 1 2 e 2 t and a linear wage w = β · (y 1 + y 2 ) is paid by the principal at the end of t = 2. Hence, the agent's utility is given by
and the principal's net payoff on the agent's effort equals
in each period where θ > β and θ represents the return on the agent's output for the principal. Hence, θ − β is the net return on output after the variable compensation has been paid. Naturally, the players interests are not completely in line because the principal wants her agent to exert as much effort as possible but the agent has to bear the respective costs of effort. When only the prior information about his actual ability is available to him, the agent would choose an effort level e * according to
in order to maximize the expected value of his periodic utility function (1). Note that the agent's effort decision depends on his ability which is unknown to him ex ante. However, in this setting the principal has the opportunity to give feedback to her agent at an interim stage, after period t = 1. The principal learns whether the agent's actual ability is low with a L or high with a H . The idea behind this is the following: Due to more experience the principal is able to determine if her agent has high or low ability a. Given this information the principal can decide if and how she wants to give feedback on ability to the agent. For this purpose we assume that the principal can select one option from the following set f ∈ {f 0 ; f L ; f H }, where f 0 denotes the case in which the principal gives no feedback at all. Furthermore, f L states that the actual ability is low which is negative feedback and f H specifies that the actual ability is high which is positive feedback. Note that the agent cannot verify the principal's feedback until the game ends.
This set-up constitutes a signaling game with three possible actions from which the principal can choose. After observing the principal's feedback signal, the agent might update his beliefs about his own ability, namely calculate a posterior belief that his actual ability is high. We will refer to this posterior probability as π (f ) in the following (off equilibrium beliefs are denoted by e π). As a consequence, the agent will base his second period effort decision on this updated information. The key question is, can the agent trust the information revealed in the feedback signal or not?
When giving feedback, the principal can deceive the agent in two ways: First, she can tell the agent that the actual ability is low when it is in fact high. Second, she can tell him that the actual ability is high even though it is low. The latter option is much more attractive for the principal if the agent naively trusts the principal's feedback. Nevertheless let us assume that in both cases the principal has to bear constant costs l > 0 if she lies to her agent. These costs are equal for both cases of deception. If she gives no feedback no costs of lying arise. The crucial issue is whether it is in the principal's best interest to tell the truth.
Finally, we summarize the time structure of the game:
• In t = 1 the agent chooses an effort level e 1 .
• Afterwards the principal observes the agent's effort, determines his ability and decides whether or not to give feedback to her agent. The available set of feedback signals is f ∈ {f 0 ; f L ; f H }, i.e. giving no feedback, or claiming the actual ability is high or low. By assumption deception generates cost l > 0 for the principal. The agent receives the signal f .
• Given this feedback information f, the agent makes a second effort decision e 2 in period t = 2.
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• Both parties receive their respective payoffs.
This situation constitutes a dynamic game with asymmetric information. Thus, the equilibrium concept is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized by -the principal's strategy described by a combination of f ∈ {f 0 ; f L ; f H } for both outcomes of the actual ability, -a posterior probability π that the actual realization of the agent's ability is high characterizing the agent's beliefs after having observed the principal's feedback decision, and -the agent's strategy denoted by an effort level in each period, i.e. e 1 for period 1 and e 2 (π) for period 2.
The results are developed in the subsequent section.
Theoretical Results
It turns out that the agent's equilibrium strategy in t = 1 is easy to analyze: In equilibria in which the principal plays a strategy which is not contingent on the agent's first period effort, (3) maximizes the agent's utility in period 1. Then, the optimal effort choice is based on the agent's prior belief e * 1 = e * 1 (τ ). A strategy contingent on e 1 can only be part of an equilibrium if the principal is indifferent between two feedback decisions. As will become clear, this will not arise in the generic cases. Hence, we focus on those equilibria in which the principal does not condition her feedback on the agent's first period effort.
The agent's effort decision in t = 2 depends on his updated information, i.e. e * 2 = e * 2 (π). Consider a situation in which the agent was naive such that he believed that the feedback information would always be correct. Then he would choose β · a H ≡ e H when receiving positive feedback and
when hearing negative feedback. However, the principal can act strategically when giving feedback. Therefore, we examine which perfect Bayesian equilibria exist in the described set-up. In the following we focus on the second period as the effort level in the first period is (3). In the appendix, a detailed derivation of the following equilibria can be found.
Proposition 1 A separating equilibrium exists in which all types give honest feedback when the costs of lying are sufficiently high according to
i.e. the principal gives positive feedback f H if the actual ability is high and negative feedback f L otherwise. If the costs of lying are zero, there are no separating equilibria in the game in which the principal gives honest feedback for one or both ability realizations.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the described equilibrium exists, the principal's returns on deception are too low compared to the corresponding costs and therefore honesty pays off for her. As the costs of lying represent the signaling costs in this game, separating equilibria never exist for zero costs of lying. The simple intuition is the following: when there are zero costs of lying the principal employing a low ability agent will always imitate the signal of a principal employing a high ability agent because with no costs of lying every signal is free. Consequently, only pooling equilibria are feasible. However, if costs of lying are sufficiently high a separating equilibrium exists in which the principal always tells the truth. Only in the latter case does the feedback indeed contain valuable information.
We obtain a similar separating equilibrium under the same conditions in which the principal gives positive feedback to a high ability agent but no feedback to a low ability agent. That is, the principal does not lie but avoids truthful feedback for low ability agents.
If the costs of lying decrease, deception becomes more attractive to the principal in the case of a low ability agent. Thus, for sufficiently low costs, we find that all principals will give positive feedback, i.e. claim that the agent's actual ability is high independent of the true realization.
Proposition 2 With sufficiently low costs of lying, namely
there is a pooling equilibrium in which the principal always reports that the true ability is high, i.e. gives positive feedback.
As decreasing costs of lying represent lower signaling costs, reporting high ability when the true ability is low becomes more attractive. Then the principal is more likely to pretend that the actual ability is high even if it is low. Note that the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 1 and the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 can never coexist for given costs of lying l as long as e π > 0. That is, we have separating equilibria for higher and pooling equilibria for lower costs of lying.
An important question with regard to the described setting is whether the revelation of information pays off in terms of efficiency. For an efficiency analysis we compare the ex ante expected social welfare of the no feedback pooling equilibrium with a separating equilibrium. In the no feedback pooling equilibrium the principal does not have to bear any costs of lying, so it is the most beneficial pooling equilibrium for him. As all pooling equilibria lead ex ante to the same expected utility for the agent, the no feedback pooling equilibrium is the most efficient one. Furthermore, neither the principal's nor the agent's ex ante expected utility differs across the separating equilibria. Hence, all separating equilibria are equally efficient and we can select any of them for comparison to the no feedback pooling situation. Comparing the outcomes of the two types of equilibria, yields the following result:
Proposition 3 In any separating equilibrium the ex ante expected utility of both agent and principal is higher than in any pooling equilibrium. Hence, the social welfare is higher as well.
In a separating situation the true ability is revealed, enabling the agent to adjust the optimal effort level to the new information, i.e. he chooses a high effort level when the true ability turns out to be high and a low one when it turns out to be low. In contrast to that, he does not learn the ability information in the pooling equilibrium. So the agent exerts an effort corresponding to the ex ante expected value of ability. This effort level is from an ex post point of view either too high (when the true ability is low) or too low (when the true ability is high). It follows that the agent is better off in a separating equilibrium. The principal also benefits from the separating equilibrium which is driven by the agent's productivity. Ex ante the expected effort exerted by the agent is equal in the pooling and the separating equilibria. However, in the separating equilibria the agent exerts high second period effort when he is more productive and low second period effort when he is less productive. So altogether the principal profits more from the higher effort level expended by an agent with high ability than he suffers from the lower effort level demonstrated by an agent with low ability making the separating equilibria more beneficial than the pooling equilibria. From that we can draw the conclusion that even the principal is better off in a separating equilibrium. Thus, both parties benefit from separating equilibria and consequently social welfare is higher compared to any pooling equilibrium.
Experimental Design and Procedures
In our experiment we used a two-player feedback. 4 In this game we had two types of players, namely principals and agents. They played in matched groups, each consisting of one principal and one agent. 5 All subjects played 15 rounds and a round consisted of two periods each. The agent's ability was determined by a random draw before each round and remained constant over the two periods of a round. It was common knowledge, that the ability could take value 2 or 6 with equal probability hence τ = 0.5. In the first period the agent was asked to choose an effort level out of the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
For each effort level the agent had to bear the respective costs according to Table 1 represented by the quadratic cost function c (e) = After the first period the principal observed the agent's first period decision and learned his actual ability i.e. the true realization of the random draw. Then the principal could choose one out of three messages to provide information to the agent:
• The actual ability is 2.
• The actual ability is 6.
• No message.
After the agent had received the selected message the second period started. The agent was again asked to select an effort level out of the set described above with the corresponding costs ( Table 1 ). After that both players were informed about their individual payoffs in the first and the second period and the total payoff of the particular round. The agent's payoff for each period of a round was calculated according to
with a being the actual ability and e the selected effort level. Thus, the agent was compensated by a linear incentive contract with a piece rate β = 1 and a fixed payment of 16. For the principal the payoff for each period was
Hence, the output produced by a · e is multiplied by a return factor θ.
Note that payoffs of all players only depend on the actions taken as there are no direct monetary costs of feedback for the principal, neither for giving true feedback information nor for lying. Thus, if there are costs of lying they would be only indirect personal or psychological costs. Obviously, it is in the principal's best interest that the agent exerts higher effort levels. For each possible realization of ability there is an inner solution maximizing the agent's objective function. If the agent knows that the true ability level is 6 (2), his best answer is to choose an effort level of 6 (2). A priori the agent's best effort choice is 4 as both values of the ability are equally probable.
The parameterization varied between conditions to test our theoretical results. Hence, in the baseline condition the principals' return θ − β was equal to 2. 6 In the low return condition we set the return factor θ to a lower level, i.e. θ − β = 1.5. In both conditions principals and agents were matched to a new anonymous counterpart after each round. We also tested a third condition, which we call partners condition, without new matching. We will refer to this in section 5.4.
Altogether 172 students of various faculties participated in the experiments. For the recruitment of the participants we used the online recruitment system by Greiner (2003) . All sessions were run at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research, University of Cologne in November 2005 and January 2006. We used the experimental software z-tree by Fischbacher (1999) for programming the experiment. The procedure was such that the participants were given oral instructions by the experimenter which were accompanied by several presentation slides including screen shots.
7 After that each subject went into an own cabin in which the computer terminal was placed. In addition to the oral instructions the subjects received short printed instructions which were laid out in each cabin. 8 After the last round of the experiment subjects were requested to complete a questionnaire including an instrument measuring the individual's Machiavellianism developed by Henning and Six (1977) . 9 In the experiment we used tokens where each token was worth 0.167
Euro. For paying the subjects, one round was drawn by lot. The sum of both periods' profits of that round was paid out at the end of the sessions. Additionally, all subjects received a show up fee of 2.50 Euro independent of the number of tokens gained. Subjects earned approximately 12 Euro on average. The whole procedure took about 90 minutes.
Hypotheses
In the first periods only the agents make decisions. We predict that they would choose the optimal effort level of 4 which corresponds to the a priori expected value of the ability. This should be the case in all conditions (Hypothesis 1). Featuring pooling and separating equilibria, the signaling game does not provide clear predictions for how the subjects might react in the second periods unless we know the actual costs of lying l. In the case where individual costs of lying are relatively low, we are more likely to observe a pooling equi-7 These slides are available from the authors on request. 8 For the printed instructions see appendix. 9 The details concerning this instrument are described in section 5. librium in which principals lie to their agents when their true ability is low. That is, regardless of the true ability, the principals report that the true ability is 6 and there are no differences in feedback behavior between rounds with different abilities. In that case, in line with Proposition 2, the agents should stick to an effort level of 4 in the second period according to the a priori expected value of their ability (Hypothesis 2).
Conversely, if the costs of lying are relatively high, the principals might act honestly even if the true ability is low (Proposition 1). In that case we should observe differences in the principals' feedback behavior between those rounds when they encounter agents with an ability of 2 and those with a true ability of 6. Hence, the agents should adjust their effort decision in period t = 2. After receiving the feedback that the actual ability is 2, the optimal effort choice should be 2, and when being told that the actual ability is 6, the second period effort should equal 6 (Hypothesis 3).
Note that apart from the costs of lying, principals should ex ante prefer the separating equilibrium with an expected second period payoff of 20θ for the principal whereas in the pooling equilibrium the expected second period payoff is 16θ.
According to Proposition 3 and Gneezy (2005) we should observe more honesty when the principals' return to the agents' effort is lower. Consequently, there should be differences in the feedback behavior of subjects in the baseline and the low return condition. And in turn, the agents should be more likely to trust their principals resulting in more frequent adjustments of their second period effort levels in the low return condition compared to the baseline condition results (Hypothesis 4).
Empirical Findings
Descriptive Results
Let us first consider some descriptive results to get a first impression of the empirical outcomes. With regard to the principals the interesting question is obviously: what kind of feedback did the respective subject send to her agent? As each principal has three options regarding this decision, namely no feedback, negative feedback and positive feedback, we differentiate between these three options in the analysis. Still, it is important to consider under which circumstances the principal chose the respective option, i.e. if the true ability was low or high. Hence, we give statistics on the feedback behavior conditional on the true ability. Table 2 presents the fraction of no feedback, negative feedback and positive feedback, for the baseline and the low return conditions over all subjects and all rounds given that the true ability was high. Table 2 giving positive feedback was chosen much more often than the other two options if the true ability was high. That is, in both conditions almost all subjects gave feedback truthfully. Hence, subjects obviously consider positive feedback to be the most attractive option to choose independent of the condition they are in. In the low ability case, the results look different as shown in Table 3 .463 .649 Table 3 : Feedback decisions across conditions when ability was low
In this case most principals gave positive feedback although the true ability is low which is deceptive. Moreover, the no feedback message is sent much more often than it is with high ability indicating that the principals use this option to avoid telling lies.
Let us now consider the agents' effort decisions. In the first period of each round subjects do not have any information on the actual ability realization. But agents can condition their second period effort decision on the feedback information received between periods. According to our theory, this feedback might make a difference and therefore we present the second period efforts separately for positive and negative feedback in Table 4 . In the first periods the average effort level chosen by the agents was almost 4 which is close to the theoretical prediction as described in Hypothesis 1.
10 In the second periods the selected efforts indeed differ depending on the feedback observed. The second period effort seems to be higher when positive feedback was given compared to the cases when no or negative feedback was given.
In the following sections we will analyze the data in detail and interpret the results.
The Existence of Costs of Lying
Do Principals Suffer from Costs of Lying?
Our first question is: do costs of lying even exist? As discussed above, the principals might have an incentive to report that the agent's ability is high even though his true ability is low. If the agents trust their principals naively, the latter benefit from lying in low ability cases. In contrast there is no obvious advantage to deception in high ability cases.
To examine whether principals indeed suffer from costs of lying, we considered the feedback decision separately depending on whether the actual ability is low or high in the baseline condition. The first column of Table  2 supports the argument we offered in the last paragraph. Around 93% of the principals gave positive and thus honest feedback if their agent showed high ability in the baseline condition. For the low ability case ( Table 3 , first column), the fraction of honest feedback is much lower. Here only about 23% of the agents received honest negative feedback. Principals gave positive feedback substantially more often to high ability than to low ability agents, despite the incentive to always give positive feedback independent of the actual ability. Hence, we suppose that principals do consider the true ability value when deciding what feedback to give and there are at least some honest principals among our subjects. Indeed, there seem to be costs of lying, although here they are not monetary but instead subjective psychological costs.
However, not all of the principals always give positive feedback when the true ability is high. There are two possible causes, one technical and one theoretical, for this scenario: First, it suggests that some of the subjects did not understand the design of the game and therefore made mistakes accordingly. Second, they might have consciously chosen to lie or to give no feedback for high ability because they thought that the agents would not believe the positive feedback anyway.
To further analyze our data, we use variables for each principal in the sample reflecting the individual feedback behavior. As we want to grasp information from all rounds, we computed the fraction of cases in which a particular principal chose to give positive feedback when the true ability was low (recall that the mean of this variable over all subjects is .46, see Table  3 , first column). However, if the actual ability is low, positive feedback is, of course, a deception. We also determined the fraction of positive feedback messages for each principal when the true ability was high which gives a rate of truthful feedback to the agents (recall that the mean of this variable over all subjects is .93, see Table 2 , first column).
Significant differences between these fraction variables for each individual would imply that there is some obstacle deterring principals from deceiving their agent's if the true ability is low. As these two variables are dependent, we analyze the differences between these kinds of feedback behavior by applying the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test for dependent samples.
The results imply that principals make use of the positive feedback option highly significantly more often if the true ability is high (z-value −4.648).
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From that we may conclude that subjects indeed consider the actual ability and have a preference for being honest to their agent. This result may indicate that at least some principals choose strategies corresponding to a separating equilibrium which is described in Hypothesis 2. 
Are There Certain Types of Principals?
According to the theory the costs of lying play a crucial role in the principals' decisions. Consequently it is important to learn more about these costs. It would be interesting to know whether principals select a certain strategy at the beginning and stick to it all over the game such that we can determine certain types of principals. If so, we could distinguish players who lie whenever it seems profitable to them from those who never lie. Figure 1 shows the percentage of lies across all low ability rounds per principal. Obviously, there are some principals in both conditions whose fraction of dishonest feedback is zero. Hence, they never lied when the agent's actual ability was low throughout the game. A zero rate of lying does not mean, however, that the respective subject always revealed the true ability as cases in which the subject gave no feedback are included. In the baseline condition there are more principals who never lied than in the low return condition. In turn, in the low return condition we find far more principals with a lie rate of one. These are subjects who lied each time when the actual ability was low. We might claim that these principals have lower costs of lying and therefore played the 11 For the low return and partners condition we find a similar relationship with z-values of −3.572 and −4.510 respectively.
12 With Proposition 1 and the parametrization of the experiment, we can calculate that false feedback (i.e. deception) in case that the true ability is low increases the principals' payoff by 16. Consequently, we can compute that the disultility from lying must be higher than 16 for subjects giving feedback honestly. pooling equilibrium (Hypothesis 2). So we have some subjects who are steadfast regarding the strategy they chose such that they either never lied or always lied with low ability. However, there are other types of players that apparently change their strategy over rounds. They have fractions of lies strictly greater than zero but strictly smaller than one. The individual behavior of those mixing subjects is presented in Figure 3 and 4 in the appendix. It seems that there is no systematic behavioral pattern in the data. Thus, it remains unclear why they changed their strategy.
To further analyze the types of principals we observed in the experiment, we look at the subjects' Machiavellianism scores to find out whether the degree of Machiavellianism can explain the individual's feedback behavior. In social psychology the notion of Machiavellianism denotes personality traits reflecting manipulativeness, egoism and the attitude that the end justifies the means and was first established by Christie and Geis (1970) . Psychological tests to measure Machiavellianism have been used before to predict behavior in trust games (see Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) ). In order to measure the subjects' machiavellianism we used an instrument by Henning and Six (1977) consisting of 18 items which are answered on a 6-point response scale (where 1 denotes strong disagreement and 6 strong agreement). 13 The human traits that are covered by machiavellianism suggest that individuals with higher scores have lower costs of lying and hence we use it as a proxy for the individual costs of lying. We test the influence of the machiavellianism score on the decision to lie with random effects probit estimation. The results are shown in Table 5 . Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Round dummies included Table 5 : Results random effects probit estimation 'Partners' is a dummy variable with value one if the subject was in the partners condition and zero otherwise. Analogously 'low return' is a dummy variable with value one for the low return condition and zero otherwise. The dummy variable 'High ability' takes the value one if the actual ability in the respective round was high and zero if it was low. The model in Table 5 shows that indeed a subject's probability to lie increases with a higher Machiavellianism score. Thus, we may conclude that the test we used measures to a certain extend the psychological costs of lying a subjects suffers from.
Do Agents Consider the Feedback Information?
In the theory section we showed that feedback can be an informative signal on the agents ability if there are sufficiently high costs of lying. The experimental data provide evidence that these psychological costs might exist in laboratory settings as well. However, whether and how signaling works out strongly depends on the agents' beliefs. Those beliefs in turn have an impact on the agents' reaction, i.e. they influence what the agents consider to be their best response in terms of their second period effort. Hence, we tested the impact of the type of feedback observed by the agents on their second period effort decision. To do so, we looked at the baseline condition effort data and compare the means of second period effort conditional on the subsequent feedback. According to Table 4 , there was a mean effort of 2.98 for no feedback, 2.43 for negative feedback, and 5.04 for positive feedback for the baseline condition. As each agent chose his second period effort 15 times, the observations are dependent and therefore, we again use the Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test. The difference between second period efforts after observing no feedback versus negative feedback is weakly significant (z-value 1.826). Thus, we might draw the conclusion that agents on average believe that low feedback is a stronger indicator for low ability than no feedback. The effort level selected by the agent after receiving no feedback and positive feedback messages respectively, demonstrates a highly significant difference in the second period efforts (z-value −4.348). Thus positive feedback increases second period efforts considerably compared to no feedback. We also find a stronger result between second period efforts while comparing negative and positive feedback. Hence, the Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test again shows a highly significant result (z-value 4.212).
14 Altogether the results support the conclusion that agents use the feedback information when adjusting their second period efforts and the change corresponds to the message they received from their principals. In particular, it indicates that some agents and some principals (as shown in the previous chapter) play a separating equilibrium. Otherwise the agents' effort adjustment would not differ between positive and negative feedback. Thus agents seem to believe that they receive different feedback information for different actual abilities and in turn, they react differently to positive, negative and no feedback respectively.
Does Deception Increase with Higher Returns?
Although we showed in the last section that costs of lying appear in both the baseline and the low return condition there may be differences in the strength of the cost effect. It seems especially intuitive that deception rises as it becomes more beneficial. Gneezy (2005) and Proposition 3 imply that the probability of observing deception is higher when the returns on lying increase. To test whether the theoretical result is valid, we compare the occurrence of lies in the baseline and low return condition. As the principals' return on the agents' effort is higher in the baseline condition principals should have stronger incentives to make their agents increase their effort. Hence, if the principals expect lying (i.e. giving positive feedback even if the actual ability is low) to have a positive impact on the agents' effort decision, they would be more likely to lie in the baseline than in the low return condition. To test this we used the fraction of dishonest feedback that each principal sent to his agents compared to all feedback decisions. Table 2 shows that, when the true ability was high, the fractions of lies were very low for both conditions. This is not surprising as deception is not very attractive in that case (mean .02 and .01, see Table 2 , second row). Running a pairwise comparison with the Mann-Whitney-U-test for those rounds with high ability the data do not highlight any significant differences.
15 When the actual ability was low, principals in the baseline condition lied less (mean .46, see Table 3 , third row, first column) than those in the low return condition (mean .65, see Table 3 , third row, third column), a result that contrasts the theoretical prediction in Proposition 3. Here, we find a weakly significant difference (z-value −1.900) between the baseline and the low return condition applying the Mann-Whitney-U-test. Consequently, we conclude that there is at least some weak evidence in the data that increasing returns on lying diminish false feedback, and this contradicts our Hypothesis 4. Hence, the separating equilibrium is less likely to occur in the low return condition than in the baseline condition as described in Proposition 1.
Our model and the results in Gneezy (2005) would lead us to predict higher lying rates for the baseline condition than for the low return condition because higher returns feature the pooling equilibrium in which all types report high ability. Observing the opposite pattern with increased deception for lower returns on lying, we do not find evidence for Hypothesis 4 which we derived from Proposition 3. Therefore, we conclude that cutting returns from lying does not necessarily enhance honesty.
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The question of why this might be the case is important. There are several possible explanations of which we will discuss two. The first refers to social preferences, namely inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Fehr and Schmidt (1999) ). According to the inequity aversion theory, inequity in payoffs leads to disutility. This approach has been shown to explain several deviations from purely rational behavioral patterns (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , Charness and Rabin (2002) , Engelmann and Strobel (2004) ). In our design principals and agents were treated and paid off inequitably. On average, the principals earned more than the agents and both parties could compute this as they knew their counterparts' complete payoff function. As the marginal returns on the agents' effort were higher for the principals in the baseline condition there was more inequality in payoffs in the baseline than in the low return condition. Deception, however, decreased the agents' payoff in favor of the principals'. Therefore principals might have refrained from lying to their agents because they realized that they were in a better position anyway and thus they tried to reduce inequality in the baseline condition.
Another possible explanation might be that the principals have reference dependent preferences and are loss averse. 17 Reference dependency suggests that individuals do not only appreciate the absolute height of the payoffs but also its height compared to a reference point. Payoffs smaller (greater) than the reference point are perceived as losses (gains). Loss aversion then captures the idea that marginal utility gains below the reference point are higher than above it. That is, utility gains above the reference point lose relative value. Due to the higher returns on effort, the principals earn more in the baseline condition than in the low return condition for a given effort level of the agent. If our subjects were loss averse and the reference point was on average exceeded in the baseline condition, they might have refrained from lying as the costs of lying were too high compared to the lower utility gains they could have realized. In turn, as they were on average below the reference point, principals in the low return condition could realize higher marginal returns and therefore it was worth to bear the costs of deception.
Long Term Relationships
Unlike in our experiment, however, employer-employee relationships are typically long term relations. Therefore the opportunity to build up reputation might play an important role in real life situations (e.g. Sobel (1985) , Wilson and Sell (1997) or Hermalin (1998) study reputation in cheap talk games). So we introduced a partners condition where we did not newly match subjects for all 15 rounds and as a consequence allowed principal-agent pairs to build up a reputation over time. As in the baseline condition, we chose θ − β = 2 in the partners condition. Hence, we compare these two conditions to figure out the effect of long term relationships. For the partners condition, it seems plausible that the principals would act more honestly compared to those in the baseline condition as they can build up reputation to be reliable partners over rounds (see Sobel (1985) for a theory of credibility). The results are displayed in Table 6 .921 Table 6 : Feedback decisions in the partners condition
For the baseline condition, we found that when the true ability was low most principals gave positive (i.e. deceptive) feedback. In contrast, in the partners condition, 65% of all feedback is negative for low ability which means that most subjects gave honest feedback.
Due to reputational concerns we would expect principals to suffer more from lying in the partners condition. However, in both conditions, baseline and partners, principals refrained from giving positive feedback highly significantly more often if the true ability was low (partners condition: z-value −4.510). Thus, the data provide evidence suggesting that costs of lying are not very sensitive to the possibility of reputation building.
More Honesty and Trust in Long Term Relationships?
Intuitively one might argue that lies destroy trust and this is likely to affect the results in future rounds. In this section, we investigate how deception influences the agents' trust in the principals' feedback messages. From the experimental literature (e.g. Camerer and Weigelt (1988) , Bohnet and Huck (2004) , Gächter and Falk (2002) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2004) , for an overview see Andreoni and Croson (2004) ) we know that reputation is an important and powerful mechanism in enhancing cooperation and trust.
Hence, we examine whether the fraction of dishonest feedback is lower when reputation can be built up. For this purpose we compare the principals' feedback behavior in the baseline and the partners condition. For the aggregate fraction of lies we find that subjects in the baseline condition lie more (.46) than those in the partners condition (.18) if the actual ability is low. Running a Mann-Whitney-U-test we find that the difference is highly significant (z-value 2.904). This implies that from an aggregate point of view long term relationships as applied in the partners condition indeed encourage subjects to act more honestly. When compared, the difference between the dishonesty of feedback in the baseline and the partners condition for high ability is very small and insignificant (baseline .022 vs. partners condition .014). Whether this increase in honesty facilitated by long term partnership is useful in that the principals substantially benefit depends on the agents' trust in the feedback information. Intuitively, one might argue that more honesty should induce agents to trust more. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7 . Looking at the agents' effort reactions we find that agents react rather reluctant if given no feedback. In the baseline condition they choose an average effort level of 2.89 and 2.53 in the partners condition. This difference between conditions is small and insignificant but supports the conclusion that the agents interpreted no feedback as a signal of low ability. For negative feedback, the agents select an average effort level of 2.43 in the baseline and 2.54 in the partners condition. Again, there are no significant differences between the conditions. However, agents in the baseline condition responded with an average effort level of 5.04 to positive feedback while subjects in the partners condition exerted an average of 5.74.
This difference indicates that agents in the partners condition trust more than those in the baseline and this is significant (z-value −2.568) applying the Mann-Whitney-U-test. Hence, it seems that in the baseline condition the increased number of deceptions leads to more distrust in positive feedback resulting in lower average second period effort levels. This therefore seems to be the obverse of deception. Lies enable the principals to realize higher profits in rounds with low ability but the agents learn about that and positive feedback becomes less credible even if it is true.
In order to disentangle these effects, we use the data of the baseline and partners condition to explain the agents' second period effort by several independent variables in a random effect regression. The estimation results are presented in Table 8 . 'Baseline' is a dummy variable with value one for the baseline condition and zero for the partners condition. 'Positive feedback' is a dummy variable with value one if the respective agent was given positive feedback in the respective round and zero otherwise. In our opinion positive feedback seems to be the most attractive and therefore the least credible action the principal can take. Analogously 'no feedback' is a dummy variable with value one if the agent was given no feedback in the respective round and zero otherwise. When the agent was given negative feedback in a round both feedback dummies (positive and no feedback) would be zero. To check for past experiences, we included a variable 'fraction of past lies' which is the proportion of lies in previous rounds that the agent experienced up to the current round. Hence, it is the running sum of lies divided by the number of previous rounds, the agent experienced in the past.
Model 1 (first column) shows that the condition does not influence the effort decision in the second periods per se. We may conclude that the agents indeed react to the positive feedback information observing that the variable 'positive feedback' leads to a highly significant increase in second period effort which is not surprising. The effect is similar but less pronounced for 'no feedback'. However, agents also seem to be sensitive toward past experiences.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses, round dummies included, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 Table 8 : Results of random effects estimation
The coefficient for 'fraction of past lies' is negative and highly significant demonstrating that agents choose lower levels of second period effort if they have been lied to more often in the past. Obviously, agents refrain from higher effort levels fearing that the feedback information might be untrue in the current round again.
Still, past experiences should only have an impact on the second period effort if positive feedback is given. Giving no feedback does not contain any information at all where lying by giving negative feedback (in case the actual ability is high) is not very attractive and therefore is rarely used. So in the latter cases of feedback one cannot draw any conclusions from previous lies. To check whether this is the case, we include interaction terms in model 2 (second column, Table 8 ) controlling for the effect of 'fraction of past lies' for positive feedback and no feedback. The coefficient for the interaction of positive feedback and the fraction of lies in previous rounds is negative and highly significant. This indicates that indeed past lies destroy the credibility of positive feedback. This is not the case for no feedback where the coefficient for the interaction term is small and insignificant. Note also that the direct effect of 'fraction of past lies' disappears in this regression model. However, some variables might have fairly different implications for the particular agent depending on the condition he is in. To control for the effect that (some of) the independent variables might have different impacts in the two conditions, we introduce several interaction terms.
In models 3 and 4 we show specifications including these interaction terms in addition. The most important difference between the two conditions seems to be the interaction of 'fraction of past lies' and 'baseline' where the coefficient is positive and highly significant. This outcome is intuitively clear since 'fraction of past lies' is more meaningful if based on one single principal rather than on many ever changing ones. In the partners condition, the agent can conclude from a high number of previously experienced lies that his principal is not a very honest partner since he remains the same person all over the game. Still, the conclusion should be less strong in the baseline condition as experiences with past principals do not necessarily lead to good predictions of the behavior of future principals. Although it is useful to up-date the expectation of the behavior of the whole 'principal population', it is less meaningful with regard to the behavior of a particular individual whose behavior has not been observed beforehand.
To conclude, we have seen that a lie has two major effects. First, in the short run a lie leads to higher second period efforts in the round in which it was told. Second, it diminishes future impacts to positive feedback in the long run. In case of the partners matching this does harm the liar's own future utility. In the baseline condition future principals suffer from a negative long term effect if matched to an agent who has been lied to in the past similar to an external effect of deception. These results generate another important issue: in this context, is lying beneficial for the principal after all if we consider both effects together, and what is the effect of deception on social welfare?
Is More Honesty Profitable and if so, for Whom?
Let us first consider the agents' payoffs displayed in Figure 2 . The left part of the figure shows that the agents' mean payoff in the first periods is quite similar across the baseline and the partners conditions. Using the MannWhitney-U-test we do not find any significant differences. However, the left part of the figure illustrates the agents' mean payoff in the second periods after the principals have made their feedback decisions. Obviously agents in the partners condition (which has been shown to enhance honesty) yield on average higher payoffs than those in the baseline and this is highly significant with the Mann-Whitney-U-test (z-value −2.715). If we run the same analysis for total payoffs (sum of payoff in first and second periods) we find a similar but less pronounced result (z-value −1.656). These outcomes support the hypothesis that the agents in total benefit more from honesty in the relationship as true feedback allows them to make more optimal effort decisions in the second periods. With regard to the principals' payoffs, Figure 2 shows the mean payoffs in the first and second periods aggregated over all rounds. Again, the first period payoffs hardly differ between the two conditions and this is insignificant at any conventional level. Yet, when considering the second periods, we observe weakly significantly higher payoffs in the partners condition (z-value −1.657). This indicates that even the principals benefit from the lower level of deception occurring in the partners condition. However, in terms of total payoffs the difference is no longer significant. Nevertheless, we find weak evidence for a positive effect of reputation and resulting honesty on the principals' payoffs in the second periods.
The outcomes described above are interesting as deception in the short run seems to be more attractive. But, as we have shown in the previous chapter, deception causes the credibility of feedback to decrease. This in turn induces agents to reject positive feedback even if true. Therefore the positive effect of true positive feedback (when the actual ability is high) diminishes. Hence, more honesty indirectly leads to an increase in payoffs for the principals. Finally, we may conclude that honesty seems to raise social welfare as it not only features a strong positive impact on the agents' second period payoff but also a weak positive impact on the principals' second period payoff. Both parties seem to benefit from reputational systems enhancing honesty.
Summary and Discussion
In this paper we have theoretically and experimentally examined the role of the principal's feedback honesty in a framework in which the agent's actual ability is uncertain. As the agent's monetary payoff is output-based his optimal effort level increases with his ability. The model posits that the principal (who is the only one to know the true ability) might prefer to lie to the agent about his ability. In particular she might tell the agent that he has high ability even when, in reality, the agent has low ability because there are sufficiently low costs associated with lying. In that case we obtain a pooling equilibrium and the true ability is not revealed. In turn, for higher costs of lying separating equilibria become feasible.
The experimental outcomes show that some principals seem to play separating strategies which indicates that costs of lying indeed exist. Further, we are able to distinguish the steadfastly honest from the steadfastly deceiving as well as mark the principals who vacillate. Hence, we conclude that for some people deception is associated with costs, even if the costs are not monetary but instead are driven by a reluctance to break religious or ethical rules or the threat of a bad conscience. Although deception is widespread, the agents adjust their effort according to the received feedback information and thus increase the principals' payoffs in the respective round. Still, past experiences of deception undermine the agents' trust in the feedback they receive. That is, the impact of the feedback information on the agents' effort decreases with the number of lies the latter has previously experienced. Hence, we might say that deception has serious and measurable external effects.
Surprisingly, decreased incentives to lie do not induce principals to act more honestly. Instead, we observe the opposite pattern as deception rates even rise. This contradicts not only our theoretical prediction but also observations in Gneezy (2005) . As lower incentives to lie come along with lower payoffs of the principals, the more aggressive lying behavior might be explained by alternative approaches such as inequity aversion or reference dependency and loss aversion.
Additionally, we find strong evidence that long term relationships enhance honesty due to reputational concerns. In long term partnerships the principals make use of deception less often. Furthermore the agents react much more sensitively toward past experiences of deception if they interact with the same principal continuously. In this case the principals harm themselves by lying to their agent. This shows that indeed lies have a negative long term effect in continuous partnerships leading to more honesty.
Finally, both, our theoretical results and our experimental data show that being honest is worthwhile in the long run. Then, both parties benefit if the true ability is revealed. So, if the principal was able to commit himself to being honest to the agent in the future this would lead to an increase in welfare.
Even if we neglect any social or ethical aspects of honesty and deception, employers and employees are ex-ante better off with truthful performance feedback because it yields higher economic payoffs. Thus, we can rephrase the saying "though he's poor, he's an honest man" and instead say "though he's honest, he's a rich man."
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First we will refer to the separating equilibrium in which the principal is always honest, so we can describe her strategy as (f L , f H ). The expression to the left (right) of the comma refers to the principal's choice of action if the true ability is low (high). Hence, if the agent receives negative feedback he will know that his true ability is low. Therefore he will choose e * = βa L ≡ e L . Analogously, if the agent observes positive feedback f H he will be sure that his actual ability is high and exert an effort level according to e * = βa H ≡ e H . When the agent observes no feedback f 0 off the equilibrium path his reaction function is defined by e * (e π) = β [e πa H + (1 − e π) a L ] and therefore a function of his belief e π, that the true ability is high. To ensure that the principal indeed plays (f L , f H ) without incentive to deviate in equilibrium, his strategy must be optimal. Thus, in case of a = a L ,
must be valid. This is the case, if costs of lying l are sufficiently high. In the case of a = a H the corresponding condition is:
Condition (6) is always met as the right hand side is strictly negative, but the costs of lying are positive. Yet, the principal can also deviate off the equilibrium path by choosing f 0 . If the true ability is low a = a L , she faces the following condition:
Condition (7) can only be met when the agent's belief that the true ability is high e π equals zero. In the case where the true ability is high we obtain the condition:
It is obvious that this condition is always met. Therefore the respective separating equilibrium does exist if conditions (5) and (7) hold. However, when there are no costs of lying (that is l = 0) the inequality (5) is never fulfilled and this equilibrium could not exist.
Proof of Proposition 2.
In the pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 2 the principal always chooses to give positive feedback f H regardless of the actual ability. Hence, the agent chooses e * = e in equilibrium.
For a = a L the principal's utility is (θ − β)a L e − l. When she deviates and plays
Thus she faces the condition:
For a = a H the principal yields (θ − β)a H e in equilibrium and
But, she can as well choose f L off the equilibrium path. Then, the corresponding condition is:
Condition (11) is always met, so in equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) must hold. Note, that condition (9) can never be met if condition (5) is met. Hence, depending on the costs of lying either the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 1 or the pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 2 exists.
Proof of Proposition 3. To show that the separating equilibria are efficient, we compare the sums of the ex ante expected utilities of agent and principal in a separating equilibrium with the most efficient pooling equilibrium. The latter is the pooling equilibrium in which no feedback is given as no signaling costs arise. It does not matter which separating equilibrium is selected for comparison as they all result in the same utilities for agent and principal, respectively. Moreover, we only consider the second period because the first periods outcomes are the same for all types of equilibrium. The sum of both parties' ex ante expected utility is
in the most efficient pooling equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium it is:
Social welfare is ex ante higher in the separating equilibrium if the following inequation indicating that (13) is greater than (12) is valid:
For (14) to be greater than zero, the terms in brackets have to be greater than zero because by assumption (θ − β) > 0 and β > 0 :
According to the Jensen inequality, this is true.
In addition we will analyze the remaining 3 equilibria existing in the game in the following: 1. We discuss the candidate (f 0 , f H ). Hence, the principal will not deviate in the equilibrium for a = a L if condition (5) is met. In the case of a = a H the corresponding condition is:
e H ≥ e L Condition (15) is always met. Yet, the principal can deviate from the equilibrium path by choosing f L . Then for a = a L :
must hold. However, condition (16) can only be met when the agent's belief e π that the true ability is high equals zero. Considering the case where the true ability is high we obtain the condition:
It is obvious that this condition is always met as l > 0. Therefore the respective separating equilibrium exists if conditions (15) and (17) are met.
2. Suppose a pooling equilibrium in which all types choose to give no feedback f 0 . For a = a L the principal's utility is (θ − β)a L e. When she deviates to f L , she receives (θ − β)a L [e πe H + (1 − e π) e L ]. Thus, she faces the condition:
But she can as well play f H off the equilibrium path. Then the corresponding condition is:
For a = a H the principal yields (θ − β)a H e in equilibrium and (θ − β)a H [e πe H + (1 − e π) e L ] − l if she deviates to f L :
If the principals deviates to f H (θ − β)a H e ≥ (θ − β)a H [e πe H + (1 − e π) e L ]
τ ≥ e π
must be met. Hence, in equilibrium conditions (18) to (21) must hold.
3. Consider a pooling equilibrium in which f L is always chosen. If a = a L this is optimal compared to f 0 when
holds. But, the principal can as well give positive feedback off the equilibrium path. Then, the corresponding condition is:
For a = a H the principal yields (θ − β)a H e − l in equilibrium and (θ − β)a L [e πe H + (1 − e π) e L ] if she deviates to f 0 or f H :
[e H − e L ] (θ − β) (τ − e π) a H ≥ l (24) must be met. Hence, in equilibrium (22) to (24) must hold.
Short Instructions
Before each round starts, one Player A is matched to one Player B. Each round consists of two periods. A factor is randomly drawn before every round starts. The factor is unknown to Player A as well as to Player B, but can only take the value 2 or the value 6. In 50 percent of the cases the factor is 2 and in 50 percent of the cases it is 6. Then the first round starts:
Player A is asked to select a number between 1 and 8. For each number he has to bear the specific cost of the number which are directly subtracted from his account. Effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Costs of Effort 0.5 2.0 4.5 8.0 12.5 18.0 24.5 32.0
After that, Period 1 is finished and Player B gets to know which factor was drawn beforehand. Player B is then asked to send a message to Player A. In this message Player B can tell that the factor is 2 or 6. But she can also decide not to send any message. Look at the screenshot:
Now you can send a message to Player A Please choose one of the following options:
I let Player A know, that the factor in this round is 2.
I let Player A know, that the factor of this round is 6. I do not want to send a message to Player A.
The selected message will be send to Player A and Period 2 begins. In Period 2, Player A is again asked to choose a number between 1 and 8. It is important to note, that the random factor from Period 1 remains the same in Period 2.
Random draw of the factor 2. Period: Player A receives the message and chooses between 1 and 8 Player B gets to know the actual value of the factor (which is either 2 or 6) Player B selects a message and sends it to Player A 1. Period: Player A chooses a number between 1 and 8 2. Period: Player A receives the message and chooses between 1 and 8
Player B gets to know the actual value of the factor (which is either 2 or 6) Player B selects a message and sends it to Player A 1. Period: Player A chooses a number between 1 and 8
The players will be told the number of tokens from the two periods
For each period, both types of players receive their tokens depending on the number that was chosen by Player A.
For Player A the tokens per period are calculated as follows:
Tokens for Player A: 16 + Factor*Number -Cost of the number For Player B the tokens per period are calculated as follows:
Tokens for Player B: 2*Factor*Number
In total, there are 15 rounds consisting of the 2 periods described above. Before every new round starts, the factor 2 or 6 is again randomly drawn and you will be matched to a new player to which you have not been assigned to before. One of the rounds will be drawn by lot for your compensation of the experiment. Both periods of this round will be paid off. One token is equals 0.167 Euro. 
